Getting it right: integrating the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance enterprise by Gary Waters
NUMBER 18 April 2014
PAPERS
Gary Waters
Getting it Right: Integrating 
the Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance Enterprise
Kokoda Paper No. 18 
April 2014
GETTING IT RIGHT: 
INTEGRATING THE  
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE  
AND RECONNAISSANCE ENTERPRISE
Gary Waters
The Kokoda Foundation
www.kokodafoundation.org
Researching Australia’s  
Future Security Challenges
About the Kokoda Foundation
The Kokoda Foundation is a registered charity and not-for-profit organisation. 
Its research is independent and non-partisan. The Kokoda Foundation does 
not take institutional positions on policy issues nor do sponsors have editorial 
influence. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this 
publication should be understood to be solely those of the author. 
Published in Australia by the Kokoda Foundation, April 2014.
© The Kokoda Foundation
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private 
study, research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no 
part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Inquiries 
should be made to the publisher. This book must not be circulated in any other 
binding or cover.
National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry
Author: Waters, Gary, 1951- author.
Title:  Getting it right : integrating the intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance enterprise / Gary Waters.
ISBN: 9780980730678 (paperback)
Series: Kokoda papers ; no. 18.
Subjects: Military intelligence--Australia.
 Military surveillance--Australia.
 Military reconnaissance.
Dewey Number: 355.343
Series Editor: Catherine Scott
Publication Management: QOTE Canberra (02) 6162 1258
Printed by: Union Offset
Published and distributed by:
The Kokoda Foundation
2/10 Kennedy Street
(PO Box 4060), Kingston ACT 2604
T: +61 2 6295 1555
F: +61 2 6169 3019
Email: info@kokodafoundation.org
Web: www.kokodafoundation.org
Additional copies are available from the Foundation at 
A$22.00 per copy (including GST and postage in Australia).
Kokoda Paper 18 – April 2014 iii
Getting it Right: Integrating the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) functions 
are essential for effective operations (encompassing military, border 
protection and law enforcement) and strategic decision-making. 
These functions provide greater situational awareness and better 
predictive intelligence necessary for superior decision-making at all 
levels. ISR synchronises and integrates the planning and operation of 
platforms, sensors, data and people.
Effectiveness of ISR depends on well-integrated technology and 
highly-capable people who constantly find new and innovative uses 
for that technology. Recruiting, training and retaining these people will 
be vital for dealing with the increasingly complicated challenges of 
the future. 
The purpose of this Kokoda ISR Project is to develop new ideas 
for a future Australian ISR Enterprise that complements the emerging 
national security framework and positions ISR as a sovereign 
capability. Concerns have been expressed that the opportunities, 
challenges and risks confronting the national ISR community have 
increased and become more diverse in recent years. Consequently, 
the potential for extending the current Whole-of-Government approach 
to exploiting ISR and better accommodating Industry into the national 
ISR infrastructure needs to be explored. Innovation and integration 
of new ISR methods, systems, and concepts will be important for 
future success.
For the immediate future, Australia’s military and law-enforcement 
organisations will need to embrace strategic, operational, 
organisational, technological, process, and cultural change in a 
tough fiscal climate, and demonstrate how they can achieve more 
with existing capabilities and organisations. They will need to 
meet the public expectation of effectiveness, responsiveness and 
accountability, and a well-integrated and robust ISR function will be 
critical in this respect.
ISR must be treated as an integrated process, moving it in 
complexity, speed, and effectiveness beyond the current model of 
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inter-agency cooperation. Indeed, cooperation, coordination and 
interoperability are no longer enough: collaboration must be the order 
of the day.
The ISR Enterprise is now undertaking a much broader range of 
functions across increased areas than in the past. Indeed, the ISR 
function and its community represent a national capability, which 
means all efforts should come together in a whole-of-nation approach 
that brings in industry, academia, State jurisdictions and Federal 
agencies. This demands a strategic design from the outset and a new 
culture around closer collaboration. 
It is vital for public engagement to be improved - the social balance 
between expectations of actions for security and the need for privacy 
must be struck if the ISR Enterprise expects to retain any form of 
social licence. Greater transparency of the checks and balances 
imposed on the ISR Enterprise can lead to a substantial increase in 
the level of trust from the public. 
It is also vital to deal with the increasing volume of data, as well 
as its variety, velocity and variable veracity to extract greater insights 
and more reliable prediction of events. Accelerating the data-to-
decision cycle would allow faster transition from collection to analysis, 
decision and action; and greater confidence in the analysis, decisions 
and actions.
It is crucial to synchronise the development of ISR capabilities, 
which demands from the start, a multi-disciplinary approach to 
collection. Greater synchronisation of ISR capabilities would support 
the other policy objectives of adopting a whole-of-nation approach, 
improving public engagement, and accelerating the decision-to-
action cycle. 
From a strategic design perspective, Australia should align its 
vision, governance, infrastructure, data, and workforce across the ISR 
Enterprise. This is needed to meld with the emerging national security 
framework as it copes with the whole-of-government (and whole-of-
nation) approach to handling crises. This alignment is also needed 
to meet the continuing tight national fiscal situation that will demand 
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an evaluation of priorities for all ISR agencies, including how they 
collaborate and how they invest in and synchronise their capabilities. 
All of this will place different demands on the workforce and the 
ISR Enterprise needs to be investing now in new competencies; 
improving workforce skills; and better coordinating the workflow of 
people, resources and materials.
This Kokoda Paper acknowledges the need to pursue the current 
trajectory in making the most of Australia’s organisations, capabilities, 
and international and national cooperation. But it also recommends 
four policy approaches that should be pursued - adopting a whole-
of-nation approach, improving public engagement, accelerating the 
data-to-decision cycle, and synchronising ISR capabilities – and 
outlines specific proposals within each of these areas.
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INTRODUCTION
Understanding the environment in which a conflict is being or will 
be conducted has always been a central element of military thinking. 
In today’s world, this understanding is embraced by three elements: 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). Whilst ISR has 
traditionally focussed on military operations, the last century has seen 
an increasing emergence of ISR as a construct and capability that 
might support a broader ‘national interest’. Indeed, today the national 
security community is engaged as both a user and contributor, and the 
need has recently emerged for an ISR capability that supports border 
protection in which a ‘national’ or ‘sovereign’ interest, as opposed to a 
‘military’ paradigm, has come to the fore.
Conceptually, an ISR capability allows for the observation and 
analysis of events and the production of useful, timely information 
to support a national interest. In reality, this simple ISR construct is 
challenged by several factors: the number of events; the ability to 
observe; processing the observed events and the increasing amount 
of data; the time taken to conduct an analysis; the time to determine a 
course of action; and the time taken to respond. 
The simple ISR construct is further challenged when the many 
networked and linked sensors used to observe events are taken into 
consideration. Increased sensor inputs provide greater situational 
awareness and better predictive intelligence necessary to achieve 
superior decision-making and, hence, more effective operations. 
However, modern-day ISR systems have also significantly reduced 
the available time in the decision cycle for making sense of what is 
occurring and for carrying out an action as a result. The challenge, 
therefore, is to balance the greater situational awareness and better 
predictive intelligence with ensuring that decisions are not delayed 
waiting for additional information.
The purpose of this Kokoda ISR Project is to develop new ideas for 
a future Australian ISR Enterprise1 that complements the emerging 
1  The ISR Enterprise comprises platforms, sensors, data and people.
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national security framework and positions ISR as a sovereign 
capability. Concerns have been expressed that the opportunities, 
challenges and risks confronting the National ISR Community have 
increased and become more diverse in recent years. Consequently, 
the potential for extending the current Whole-of-Government 
approach to exploiting ISR and better accommodating Industry 
into the National ISR infrastructure needs to be explored. 
Innovation and integration of new ISR methods, systems, and 
concepts will be important for future success.
For the immediate future, Australia’s military and law-enforcement 
organisations will need to embrace strategic, operational, 
organisational, technological, process, and cultural change in a 
tough fiscal climate, and demonstrate how they can achieve more 
with existing assets and organisations. They will face challenges 
as they seek to cooperate more closely, yet feel the need to retain 
some of their traditional boundaries (noting that many of the traditional 
boundaries are set in legislation). They will need to meet the public 
expectation of effectiveness, responsiveness and accountability, and 
a well-integrated and robust ISR function will be critical in this respect.
This Kokoda Paper examines the nature of the ISR challenge 
confronting Australia and how that challenge is currently being met. 
It argues that an extension of current policy approaches that involve 
making the most of Australia’s organisations, capabilities, and 
international and national cooperation is called for. It identifies those 
other key areas for improved policy and argues the importance of 
adopting a whole-of-nation approach, improving public engagement, 
accelerating the data-to-decision cycle, and synchronising ISR 
capabilities; and recommends specific proposals for pursuing these 
policy outcomes. 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
ISR is defined here as an activity that synchronises and integrates 
the planning and operation of platforms, sensors, data and people in 
direct support of the national interest which, in the context of this study, 
involves military, border protection and law enforcement operations. 
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ISR is an integrated function in which intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance are often referred to as a collective whole, though the 
capabilities are distinctive and each fulfils a different purpose. 
The information derived from surveillance and reconnaissance, 
converted into intelligence by exploitation and analysis, is used to 
formulate strategy, policy, and/or operational plans; to develop and 
conduct campaigns; and to protect, prevent, and prevail against 
threats inimical to the nation and its interests.
While well-integrated ISR technology provides a clear advantage, 
so too does the ingenuity of the people who constantly find new and 
innovative uses for current and developing technology to provide a 
competitive advantage and enable them to achieve effects across 
military and law-enforcement operations (including customs, border 
protection and police operations). Recruiting, training and retaining 
highly-capable people who are attuned to dealing with modern-day 
challenges that grow more complicated year after year is a critical 
issue for future ISR success.
Individually and collectively, Australia’s military, police, customs 
and like organisations have probably never faced the complexity 
of the challenges they face today. High levels of connectivity and 
improved efficiency through the availability of new and cutting-edge 
technology provide an ability to connect and collect information from 
both legacy and emergent systems in the military, public and private 
domains. Public expectations that citizens will be protected and that 
those who protect them will do so with high degrees of transparency 
and accountability simply add to this complexity. While the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) has yet to address ISR as a unique military 
capability, Australia as a nation, likewise, has not considered ISR as 
a sovereign capability. 
At the tactical and operational levels there are substantial 
questions about access, control and ownership of platforms and 
systems; the standards under which they operate; and the sharing 
of data between first and subsequent users. At the strategic level 
the big questions involve organisational and system integration, the 
legislative framework, the international cooperative arrangements, 
and the funding and management paradigm for ISR.
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These questions require answers and need to be addressed in a 
more integrated and synchronised way than currently. Taking such 
an ‘enterprise’ approach is necessary for the future ISR Community 
to be able to rise to meet the complex challenges of tomorrow and 
would ensure: 
• greater engagement with the public (the public can also act as 
a resource); 
• optimised ways of working in terms of effectiveness, efficiency 
and economy (which also involves looking at the workforce 
differently such as greater use of part-time and semi- 
retired people); 
• empowered people (with real-time access to usable and 
actionable data); 
• greater use of analytics to improve predictive capability and 
operations/services (providing greater awareness and more 
cost-effective use of resources); 
• enhanced collaboration with like agencies (which will be 
difficult in a climate of competition for resources); and 
• a proactive posture (anticipating developments and getting 
ahead of the changes so as to be less reactive). 
THE NATURE OF THE ISR CHALLENGE 
The goal of ISR activities is to provide accurate, relevant, and 
timely intelligence to decision-makers and operational commanders. 
This allows strategic decision-makers to determine the necessity of 
certain operations, and for operational commanders, it provides the 
intelligence and situational awareness necessary to successfully plan 
and conduct those operations.
This goal is becoming more complicated as national security 
becomes more encompassing, which imposes new and more diverse 
requirements on the ISR Enterprise. A tighter fiscal climate adds to 
this complication. 
Policy and legislative barriers continue to pose an organisational 
challenge. Existing assets tend to be acquired for single agency 
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solutions. Cooperation has improved but still seems to be more of 
an add-on than an inherent part of a systemic culture. While these 
issues have been recognised and some modest progress has been 
achieved, more needs to be done in each of these areas. 
The more problematic areas of concern are the lack of national 
collaboration across the ISR Enterprise, the weakening of social 
licence2, the apparent inability to leverage commercial developments 
in speeding up the data-to-decision cycle, and the lack of 
synchronisation in developing future ISR capabilities. Pursuing the 
current trajectory will not resolve these concerns.
IMPROVING THE CURRENT TRAJECTORY
The current trajectory is achieving modest improvements in ISR, 
but more could be done in terms of: making the most of Australia’s 
organisations (both public and private); making the most of existing 
capability; making the most of international relationships; and finally, 
making the most of national cooperation. These are addressed below.
Making the Most of Australia’s Organisations 
A key organisational challenge for Australia is to address the policy 
and legislative barriers that continue to conspire against achieving a 
seamless approach to national security and that compel agencies to 
operate within their own narrowly-defined contexts. Thus, different 
government departments and agencies continue to do essentially 
what they have always done, and no single organisation is building 
institutional capacity to ensure cooperation and collaboration in ISR 
to the extent that is necessary in the complex environment of the 
twenty-first century. Australia has a relatively small population in a 
vast continent, and as such, needs to leverage the best technology, 
2  A distinction is made in this Paper between an externally-focused social licence 
(for surveying the Australian border outwards) and an internally-focused border-
inwards approach. This is about a capability that helps Australia protect itself, not 
about a system for surveying citizens.
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the best people, the best processes, and the best institutional 
arrangements to meet the goal of ISR activities described earlier.
One obvious way forward is to avoid duplication – it makes little 
sense, for example, to have a plethora of operations rooms around 
the country essentially performing the same task. The tight fiscal 
environment and continuing budgetary constraints will force the ISR 
Enterprise to make economies over time, and it would seem sensible 
for the various agencies to make the best choices possible before 
inchoate changes are forced upon them.
Making the Most of Existing Capability 
Better utilisation of existing capability across the ISR Enterprise 
represents a real opportunity for protecting Australian sovereign 
interests. This would involve mapping the current ISR landscape 
to establish a solid foundation for the future positioning of ISR 
as a national capability. Better integration of ISR capabilities will 
allow information to be shared and applied more diversely across the 
Enterprise, ensuring that decision-makers at all levels have access 
to the best possible information so that they can make the best 
decisions possible.
It is vital that the national effort leverages all contributions across 
the national security and intelligence milieu; as well as those that 
support national security in academic and commercial enterprises. 
This includes emergent technologies such as unmanned systems. 
There is already a proliferation of small unmanned system activities 
that should be coming together in a military context, a whole-of-
government context, and a whole-of-nation context for an improved 
national ISR capability, particularly one that will need, increasingly, to 
support border protection activities. 
Unmanned systems, particularly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
or Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), are being taken up for both 
commercial and other civil purposes within a mature and receptive 
regulatory context. However, the public perception in Australia, as in 
other Western nations, of unmanned systems is largely focused on 
UAV attacks on civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as on 
the potential for unmanned systems to invade the public’s privacy back 
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home. It is clear that significant public engagement will be needed to 
improve society’s understanding of the use of unmanned systems in 
military and national security contexts.
While the wide adoption of unmanned systems might expand 
surveillance capacity significantly, the resulting information will 
not automatically translate into operationally-improved situational 
awareness. Analysis and dissemination of information requires 
specialised capacity depending on how the unmanned systems 
are to be used. Strategies will need to be developed around the 
transmission, storage and analysis of data from tactical, operational, 
strategic, and non-military unmanned systems. Increasingly, Australia 
should expect the focus of ISR to move from predominantly military 
operations to counter-terrorism and border protection operations. ISR 
will also evolve from being a support function to becoming an intrinsic 
element of all operations.
Making the Most of International Relationships
Cooperation in the capture, production, analysis and distribution 
of ISR products can be viewed as a commodity that when traded 
appropriately enhances Australia’s relationship within the ‘Five Eyes’ 
community, and with traditional allies and regional partners. This has 
particular relevance in terms of sovereign border challenges. 
Australia’s engagement in the Middle East, working alongside the 
US military, and benefiting greatly from US-owned ISR assets, has 
resulted in the Australian military learning much about the operational 
benefit derived from access to a well-structured ISR capability. The 
increased presence of US military assets in Australia and the region 
will drive the need for ISR collaboration, specifically at an operational 
and tactical level with the US Pacific Command (PACOM). 
Australia’s location and presence in the Pacific provides an ideal 
land mass from which ISR sensors can be based, thus ensuring that 
Australia has something to offer in a partnership with other nations 
with interests in the Pacific. Exchange of information requires 
common frameworks and common interests. At program levels, 
Australian adoption of American and British technology means that 
standards are inherent in the acquisition. ISR by its nature operates 
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on multiple standards and domain frameworks that do not easily 
facilitate interoperability. 
The rise and maturation of ISR as a capability in the United States 
has led to a drive towards an ISR standards framework that provides a 
mechanism through which ISR capabilities in the national security and 
military domains can interoperate. Similar ISR standards frameworks 
exist or are being developed in the United Kingdom, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union. Notwithstanding 
Australia’s partnership with the United States, a standards framework 
has yet to be developed, and more importantly the programmatic 
approach to ISR capability development seems to indicate multiple 
standards, with a consolidation path to be pursued at a later date. In 
essence, there is a real prospect of Australia retracing the American 
journey, at considerable cost in time and capability. Thus, Australia 
needs to select a standards framework to facilitate improved 
integration and collaboration. 
On the matter of collaboration, Defence partnership with the 
United States demands a highly sophisticated exchange, in which 
Australia’s ISR contribution is likely to have significant benefit to the 
nation. Regional ISR collaboration is more likely to focus on border 
protection and law enforcement initiatives. Whilst the two relationships 
present different challenges, both have enormous advantages, 
particularly in the preservation of borders and in forming closer 
international relationships. 
Making the Most of National Cooperation
The change in national security perspectives that arose following 
the terrorist events of 11th September 2001 (referred to as ‘9/11’) 
brought the question of domestic security firmly into the purview of 
military ISR; this change complicated not only the technical issues 
but also, more importantly, the legislative protocols for sharing access 
to products and insights. Such legislative issues would benefit from 
further consideration, noting that progress has already been made 
in allocating policy responsibility to the Australian Geospatial-
Intelligence Organisation (AGO) for adopting such whole-of-nation 
perspectives. AGO is now the whole-of-nation manager for all aspects 
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of the production, certification, and distribution of geospatial data for 
government and national purposes. 
The recent setting up of the Australian Cyber Security Centre also 
provides a useful example of innovative policy approaches to new and 
evolving national security challenges. The Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) provides a good example of tactical sharing of information 
with other law enforcement agencies, such as the Australian Crime 
Commission and State police, and could serve as a model for closer 
cooperation across government and across the nation. 
As Australia pursues greater integration of ISR, it will need to 
better define the roles and contributions made by members of its 
national security community, and address that community’s cultural 
challenges, including problems with cooperation that are exacerbated 
because of fiscal constraints, different technology (as well as different 
standards), and different legislation (with different agencies operating 
under different Acts). 
Australia’s ISR capability development mechanisms need to 
be better synchronised. There are different life-cycle durations 
for software, equipment, and platforms - in essence, they have 
different technology refresh cycles. Yet, they are shoe-horned into 
identical capability development processes that have evolved for 
the acquisition and sustainment of traditional major platforms. It is 
time to move away from a systems-engineering perspective for 
acquisition of ISR capability to a software-engineering approach 
that is better-suited to short life-cycle and software-dependent 
ISR capabilities. Such a move would be better enabled through an 
established ISR Enterprise approach.
Australia’s Chief Scientist has called Australia “the mendicant 
country” with respect to science, and this is most obvious in the 
nation’s access to non-defence satellite data. This is particularly 
significant when considering the broader national security concerns. 
For example, the Black Saturday bushfires were tracked through 
China’s National Space Administration; weather is predicted using 
Japanese satellites. Whenever Australia monitors crops or water 
supplies, it is giving valuable commercial and other intelligence 
to others. 
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The concern here really is about the degree of control that Australia 
has over the sources of data that inform national decision-making. 
Australia’s ongoing reliance on foreign sources is a significant issue 
and one that will be difficult to address during this time of funding 
constraints, as it leads naturally to the need for some degree of 
indigenous capability. The question becomes one of balance between 
sovereign control, access and investment for ISR assets beyond 
those that form part of the traditional military security arrangements; 
and how to balance sovereignty and security in Australia’s dealings 
with neighbours, allies and others.
It does seem that Australia’s agencies have evolved an effective 
policy-coordinating mechanism at a national level; however, 
there remains a lack of synchronisation in funding, capability 
development and maintenance, and standard setting, which 
conspire against achieving a true national-level ISR capability. 
This needs to be remedied.
FUTURE POLICY OBJECTIVES 
While effort continues in improving Australian ISR organisations, 
the use of existing ISR capability, and in international and national 
ISR cooperation, much more is needed. As mentioned earlier, this 
Kokoda Foundation Study has identified four key policy approaches or 
objectives on which to focus for the future evolution of ISR – these are: 
adopting a whole-of-nation approach, improving public engagement, 
accelerating the data-to-decision cycle, and synchronising capabilities. 
These are discussed in more detail in the remainder of this Report.
Adopting a Whole-of-Nation Approach
One of the great successes of the last decade has been the 
recognition that Australia’s national security challenges require a 
Whole-of-Government perspective to ensure greater coherence 
across federal government agencies. One manifestation of this 
approach has been a migration from a ‘need to know’ posture to 
one of a ‘need to share’. As laudable as this move has been, it now 
needs to be extended to a Whole-of-Nation approach, to include 
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State-level agencies, as well as others in industry, academia and the 
broader community.
This call for an expansion of the evolving Whole-of-Government 
approach acknowledges that agencies will be wary of pushing too 
far too fast, and of formalising something that has been going on 
organically for some time and that seems to have been working 
effectively. Thus, it will be important for any change to be seen in 
the context of building on current successes. This needs to be set 
within the context of how the agencies have responded to new 
challenges that have arisen over the past decade, and might start with 
evolving the current levels of cooperation within Australia and with the 
United States.
Recent Developments Reflecting a Response to a 
Changing World
Events over the past thirteen years that started with the ‘9/11’ 
terrorist attacks have led to tremendous change in the national security 
environment. This has included the perceived role and responsibilities 
of the intelligence community in Australia, resulting in a widening of 
scope of what the respective agencies do. The advent of the National 
Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC) has resulted in different 
agencies now aggregating and reviewing how effort is being deployed 
to address that increase in activities. 
Most recently, Australia has recognised the need for a better 
approach to cyber security by broadening the role of the Australian 
Signals Directorate (ASD) to embrace all of government, and as 
mentioned earlier, the Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organisation 
(AGO) now has a wider responsibility for geospatial awareness. 
Transnational crime also provides an example of the response 
to environmental conditions that demand the formation of new 
relationships. Border protection is the latest example of this broader 
response to changing circumstances.
Notwithstanding these positive developments, there has been 
a tendency for Government and the policy organisations to expect 
additional activities to be taken on without other activities dropping 
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off the agenda. It is vital for the senior leadership of the country to 
understand and be engaged in the vast breadth of the intelligence 
business that reaches from tactical operations support to counter-
terrorist and cyber activities to strategic functions and support to 
policy-makers. This understanding and engagement is needed to 
enable the senior leadership to help set priorities, which should also 
address the challenge of non-core work being carried out that can 
distract intelligence agencies from their core functions.
Evolving the Current Levels of Cooperation
Australian intelligence organisations have assisted each other in 
discrete areas that do not compromise their legislative obligations, 
not because it was part of their function to do so but because it was 
in the national interest. It is this sense of cooperation that must 
be harnessed to drive a new culture around closer collaboration 
in ISR more broadly that also brings in non-Commonwealth 
government organisations such as academia, industry and other 
civic actors. However, a more strategic design will be needed to 
ensure this enhanced collaboration across the ISR Enterprise.
Australia’s ISR community has gone through a decade of rapid 
growth and also rapidly rising expectations of it and increasing 
demands being placed on it. This is especially so in the intelligence 
community. However, in this current period of fiscal restraint, any 
unanticipated demands will prove difficult to manage. The challenge 
for the ISR community now is to demonstrate that it is meeting most 
of its obligations with what it has to hand, but that real improvements 
can be derived from a modest increase in resources and/or a re-
prioritisation of activities. 
The challenge for Government will be to recognise that increased 
investment will be needed to facilitate any move to a Whole-of-
Nation ISR Enterprise that will, as it matures, deliver efficiencies, 
particularly through rationalisation (and thus removal of duplication) 
and better integration of processes, people, technology, and 
administrative arrangements.
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Funding
Funding needs to occur on a predictable basis for the intelligence 
community. Historically, certainly since the early 1990s, the 
intelligence community has experienced peaks and troughs amid 
increasing expectations, and, as a result, has tended to be somewhat 
disaster- or crisis-driven. This unpredictable level of funding must 
be eliminated and the process must become more systematic 
as these funding peaks and troughs also affect the quality and 
recruitment of analysts that, in turn, impacts negatively on the 
quality of the analysis itself. 
ISR collection needs to be enduring, established early and 
maintained as a strategic tool. Collection activities need to continue 
once the crisis is over. They need to be in-place and functioning before 
the next crisis occurs. Without this, results will not occur immediately 
due to the required lead-time to build capacity, no matter what the 
Government’s urgency.
Working with the United States
With the increased focus on the Indo-Pacific, Australia has 
a wonderful opportunity to expand its partnering role with the 
United States in terms of ISR across the region, as well as in 
space and cyberspace. Australia’s Over-The-Horizon Radar 
(OTHR), also known as Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN), 
is a crucial piece in this, with its ability to detect and locate aircraft, 
missiles and ships in monitoring sea lanes and maritime chokepoints 
to the north of Australia. 
As has been suggested by US analysts, it might be possible for 
JORN to be upgraded to detect and track ballistic missile launches, 
stealth aircraft and cruise missiles. Furthermore, other regional 
countries could support receiver stations to extend JORN’s coverage, 
and thus be part of a regional ISR capability.3
3  These ideas are raised in Jim Thomas, Zack Cooper and Iskander Rehman, ‘Gateway 
to the Indo-Pacific: Australian Defense Strategy and the Future of the Australia-
U.S. Alliance’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013, p.21.
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With the introduction of Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft, 
the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers, space-based sensors, High- 
and Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance maritime surveillance UAVs, 
and P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, there is real potential for Australia 
to integrate intelligence data from these platforms with that of JORN. 
Such a capability could be part of a shared capability with the United 
States for processing, exploiting and disseminating ISR information to 
enhance situational awareness in the Indo-Pacific. 
There is also a possibility for Australia to support and extend the 
United States’ ability to monitor space launches and track satellites.4 
The space situational awareness partnership, the stationing of a 
C-Band space surveillance radar, a space surveillance telescope, 
and a combined communications gateway for the Wideband Global 
Satellite constellation of communications satellites are all examples 
of closer current cooperation between Australia and the United States 
that can be built upon. 
Strengthening Australian cyber and Electronic Warfare (EW) 
capabilities will contribute to a joint capability to disrupt hostile ISR 
and Command and Control (C2) systems during, or in the lead up 
to, conflict. As Ross Babbage suggests, Australia could undertake 
“sustained investment in high-grade cyber and information warfare 
capabilities for use both in protecting Australian and allied systems and 
also for infiltrating, disrupting, and/or damaging an opponent’s critical 
command and control and other high-value electronic systems”.5 
Regional ISR Infrastructure
The absence of capabilities in key areas, particularly situational 
awareness in the maritime environment, continues to pose problems 
for national security decision-making. The choices that other nations 
make in the South China Sea will affect Australia’s national interests, 
4  Ibid, p.22.
5  Ross Babbage, ‘Strategic Competition in the Western Pacific: An Australian 
Perspective’, in Thomas G. Mahnken, Ed., Competitive Strategies for the 21st 
Century: Theory, History and Practice, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA, 
2012, p.250.
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but the understanding of the airspace and naval space by these nations 
is very limited. Australia immediately encounters problems when 
trying to transfer skills to help improve air and maritime awareness 
in regional countries. However, Australia could approach this slightly 
differently in future by developing best practice in the area of ISR 
infrastructure resilience and transferring this to benefit regional 
countries that are still in the early stages of developing and 
connecting their ISR infrastructure.
Integrating the Elements of ISR
Any notion of integrating ISR in a strategic national sense and 
determining how best to synchronise and integrate the planning 
and operation of sensors, platforms, and Processing, Exploitation 
and Dissemination (PED) systems, demands a new focus on those 
elements that constitute the ISR function, such as: 
• Planning and Directing. This involves determining integrated 
ISR requirements, developing appropriate integrated ISR 
architectures, preparing an integrated collection plan, and 
issuing orders and requests to information collection agencies 
and assets in an integrated fashion. This would enable the 
improved synchronisation and integration of collection, 
processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination activities 
and resources to meet information requirements of national 
strategic and operational decision-makers. 
• Collection. Collection involves the acquisition of information 
and the provision of this information to processing elements. 
An integrated focus would provide the ability to obtain all of 
the required information to satisfy diverse ISR needs (through 
use of sources and methods across the entire ISR Enterprise). 
Collection activities span the full range of military, border 
protection and law enforcement operations. 
• Processing and Exploitation. Processing and exploitation 
involves the conversion of collected information into forms 
suitable to the production of intelligence. An integrated focus 
would provide the ability, across the full range of military, border 
protection and law enforcement operations, to transform, 
extract, and make available collected information suitable for 
further analysis or action. 
Getting it Right: Integrating the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise
16 Kokoda Paper 18 – April 2014
• Analysis and Production. Analysis and production involves the 
conversion of processed information into intelligence through 
the integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of all 
source data and the preparation of ISR products in support 
of known or anticipated user requirements. An integrated 
focus would provide the ability to better synchronise, 
evaluate, and interpret information from all available sources 
to create a mature ISR product that addresses a multiplicity 
of perspectives for presentation or dissemination to enable 
increased situational awareness across the full breadth 
of users. 
• Dissemination and Integration. This involves the delivery of 
ISR product to users in a suitable form and the application 
of the product to appropriate missions, tasks, and functions. 
An integrated focus would provide the ability to present 
information and ISR products across the full range of military, 
border protection and law enforcement operations enabling 
understanding of the operational environment by the relevant 
decision-makers. 
Improving Public Engagement
How Intelligence Works
Intelligence is not just expected to provide answers; it is expected 
to prevent surprise. Accordingly, most of the intelligence community’s 
work is not in response to specific questions asked by policy-makers; 
rather, the intelligence agencies have to be seeking new information 
and new insights about new topics that might loom as problems in the 
future, while also addressing current requirements.
Intelligence agencies conduct their intelligence collection and 
analysis operations according to a rigorous and well-established 
system, and policy-makers participate fully in that system. The 
intelligence agencies also operate strictly within the limits set by legal 
statutes and other administrative instructions.
In relation to the Edward Snowden revelations and implications 
for Australia, Prime Minister Abbott expressed his confidence in early 
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December 2013 that Australian intelligence agencies were acting 
within the law and that there were proper safeguards. The Attorney-
General, Senator George Brandis, also pointed out in December 2013 
that surveillance by Australian agencies was governed by a strong and 
sound legal framework that provided an appropriate balance between 
national security and the right of citizens to privacy. The Attorney-
General was at pains to highlight that Australia’s intelligence activities 
and its intelligence agencies were designed to serve Australia’s 
national interests and protect Australian citizens.
Reporting also indicated that neither the Australian Signals 
Directorate (ASD) nor the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) collects or shares metadata in bulk. Some specific metadata 
is shared in investigations involving overseas agencies but ASIO’s 
metadata collection is in line with ministerial instructions and subject 
to internal checks. While ASIO does not require a warrant to access 
the information from a telecommunications company, it would require 
a warrant from the Attorney-General if it wanted to investigate the 
actual content. 
ASD collects only specific foreign intelligence metadata. ASD 
can access information on Australian citizens if it has a ministerial 
authorisation, which would have to be signed off by the Attorney-
General. Authorisations have been granted in the past in relation to 
communications between terrorist organisations and Australians.
It is important to note that Australia’s intelligence agencies are 
overseen by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) 
and a federal parliamentary committee. IGIS staff have visibility of 
the activities of the intelligence agencies and are briefed regularly 
on sensitive operations, receive intelligence product, have access to 
systems, and carry out regular inspections of activities. 
It is the contention in this Paper that the current intelligence 
community is performing within the expectations of the Government 
and that the internal focus of intelligence needs to remain within its 
current framework, which means that the public and the Government 
have a social compact that limits the Government’s ability to spy on or 
to control its citizens. In developing a sovereign ISR capability for 
protecting national borders and beyond, the Government needs 
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to focus on areas of national interest that do not compromise the 
rights, privileges and privacy of its citizens.
The IGIS role represents a strong institutional advantage as it is 
a focal point for ensuring accountability and it delivers to the public a 
sense of confidence that the intelligence community is doing the right 
thing. Thus, the IGIS position could be used more in improving 
engagement with the wider public and in improving the sense 
of trust that exists in the ADF. This could be further expanded 
upon through greater collaboration with the Privacy Commissioner. 
Furthermore, the IGIS role could be extended to ensure that a national 
surveillance asset was only used in support of an ISR mission or task, 
with its focus on sovereign or military interest. In this way, the IGIS 
could ensure that the ISR community’s missions and tasks were not 
infringing citizens’ rights. 
Social Licence
There is a gap between the requirements of the national security 
function and the popular expectations in Australia when such 
functions are perceived as affecting privacy and personal freedoms. 
As was evidenced after ‘9/11’, the broader community can sometimes 
grant a social licence for measures that might be seen as breaching 
privacy or personal freedoms; however, as such crises become 
dimmer in society’s collective memory, the social licence can be 
withdrawn. Consequently, measures such as those required to retain 
telecommunications data, for example, can be denied.
Acceptance in society of the intelligence community and its 
need to have a particular set of powers – the granting of a social 
licence - will tend to be predicated on a level of transparency about 
what the intelligence community does domestically and improved 
understanding by society. Public fears around the invasion of 
privacy need to be allayed, which demands greater transparency 
from the Government and public officials. But it is more than 
transparency as the public can also act as a resource; thus 
greater engagement with the public is needed. 
Unmanned systems are a good example of the lack of understanding 
and concern within the general community. Unmanned systems can 
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deliver a significant level of national self-reliance for ISR, as well as 
make a valuable contribution to regional cooperation. Unmanned 
systems can contribute to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
border surveillance, cargo delivery, medical evacuation, hydrographic 
and geographic mapping, and climate analysis can be made at very 
short notice, providing immense value to regional neighbours with 
limited ISR resources. The autonomy of unmanned systems needs 
to be set within the context of positive control by humans who have 
certain responsibilities around how these vehicles are used – so it is 
important for this information to be relayed to the public. 
Because of this lack of public discourse involving the intelligence 
agencies and the public, and more importantly, the role of intelligence 
collection in the ISR Enterprise, the ISR community and the agencies 
have not been very adept at responding to tactical shocks. They 
inevitably end up on the back foot when things go wrong. Thus, it is 
incumbent on the ISR Enterprise to be more accessible to the public - 
to be an audible voice and to be visible, transparent and accountable. 
In this way, the public can also take a more active role in the national 
ISR construct and better understand how each organisation within the 
ISR community contributes to the overall Enterprise. 
Improved communication must be part of the strategic dialogue 
between Government and its key departments, the ISR Enterprise 
and the public. By informing people about checks and balances of the 
ISR Enterprise and its responsibilities, Government can substantially 
increase the level of trust from the public; thus providing support 
even when uncomfortable issues arise. It is in Government’s interest 
to encourage the ISR Enterprise (and specifically the intelligence 
institutions) to be more publicly engaged, and indeed for Government 
to more actively support them in this.
Accelerating the Data-to-Decision Cycle
The advent of computing has seen a meteoric rise in the amount 
of information that is generated and stored about the environment 
in which the world population lives and functions. Organisations 
and Governments across the world are seeking ways and means to 
exploit the information collected for political, economic, military and 
personal gain. 
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In the military and national interest sphere, the use of this data 
provides the potential to develop an understanding of events and 
connections that might otherwise be invisible. The private sector has 
exploited this data explosion to understand buying behaviour and 
the behaviour of competitors. Similarly, governments have collected 
significant volumes of data through Signals Intelligence (SIGINT). 
Compared with the private sector and intelligence community, military 
and law enforcement forces have adopted a very modest approach to 
exploiting this abundance of data, which is referred to as ‘Big Data’.
Big Data
Big Data does not just encompass volume; it also addresses 
variety, velocity and variable veracity. These are the characteristics 
of Big Data, but the issue is also about the relationships between 
these characteristics and how an organisation manages and exploits 
these relationships.
The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence’s vision for Big Data is 
one that brings together all the necessary data and exploits it so as 
“to establish clarity, increase efficiency and gain previously hidden 
intelligence”. Thus, users will be able “to access and analyse timely 
and trusted information from the most appropriate sources, through a 
variety of interfaces”.6 The opportunity that Big Data affords Australia 
is to discover the hidden intelligence through the harnessing of sensor 
data in a meaningful way. Australia probably has all the data it needs 
today, but does not have the wherewithal to bring it all together to 
make a difference.
It is worth noting that Big Data analysis systems have been 
implemented in other countries, which in the case of the United 
Kingdom, notwithstanding the initial expense, saw the customs 
system pay for itself in the first year of operation through increased 
customs revenue. New Zealand has embarked on a similar system. It 
is also worth noting that the increased revenue side of the equation 
6  See Network Technical Authority, ‘Big Data: A NTA Technical Vision, Rev, 0.4’, 
DE&S Information Systems and Services, 1 August 2013, p.5.
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is complemented by a ‘safer borders’ benefit. These anecdotal 
comments were provided during research for this Project, and it would 
be useful for government officials to pursue the veracity of these 
claims and capture any relevant lessons learned.
Ultimately, Big Data is about how the data is stored and managed 
and then how it is shared – and, in the final analysis, how it gets to 
the decision-makers. However, this desire to share data still has 
to overcome some legal roadblocks and technological and cultural 
problems.7 Since this is where Australia is heading, it should not be 
left to happenstance for these sorts of problems to be resolved; rather, 
a plan is needed to get there and to ensure legacy problems and 
privacy concerns do not become show-stoppers.
Many of the structural and systemic limitations of the past, such 
as incomplete data sets and lack of analytical capabilities, (which 
restricted the ability of organisations to gain fuller insights from the 
data collected) are now being overcome through the ever-increasing 
volume, variety and velocity of data, and the commercial sector’s 
technological and analytic capability to smartly mine this data. 
The ISR Enterprise can learn from how successful 
businesses have used Big Data to improve their competitive 
advantage through meeting three challenges. The first challenge is 
to identify the information and how and where it is stored. The second 
challenge is to tag the data to allow its characteristics to be identified. 
The third challenge is to run the data through an algorithm that allows 
it to be collated and presented to an analyst. By overcoming these 
challenges, the ISR Enterprise can use Big Data to help make better 
and faster decisions.
Australia has relied on the United States as the dominant source of 
ISR capability (for example, US satellite technology underpins much 
of Australia’s imagery capability and spatial awareness (location)). It 
is quite likely that competence and capability in Big Data will 
become a mandatory requirement for future operations with 
7  The quasi separation of military and law enforcement powers is one example, 
where military assistance has to be formally requested for disaster relief.
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the United States – and Australia will need to address this if it 
wishes to continue to access US ISR capability in future.
Analytics
ISR data comes from a number of sources and platforms, and is 
quite diverse, with large quantities of imagery and video generated 
every day. Big Data analytics have a potentially significant role 
in helping to manage the flood of data and assisting analysts to 
focus their efforts on analysing content rather than searching 
for relevant information, while also ensuring full adherence to 
laws and regulations that protect citizens’ rights. Big Data also has 
applications in cyber security, providing network managers with the 
means to process large numbers of attacks and identify the more 
serious advanced persistent threats. 
The ever increasing volume and velocity of data means greater 
emphasis is needed on analytical capability and greater protection is 
needed for analytical integrity. The data is out there somewhere, and 
the real issue is accessing it and working through it meaningfully in a 
time frame that allows the true value to be derived. While infrastructure 
is key, so too are agile commercial relationships that will help reduce 
the cost of operational maintenance and allow investment in enablers 
as well as the traditional platforms and sensors.
The impact of failing to exploit national security-related data 
could be far higher than that faced by the private sector which has to 
deal with loss of profit or market share. The operators expect rapid 
intelligence to support their responses, with timeframes measured in 
seconds, which demands constant and rapid analysis. Intelligence 
analysts are moving away from monitoring routine ‘pattern of 
life’ details to immediate analysis of fleeting, real-time data. This 
demands corresponding improvements in tools and techniques 
to support the search and analysis of data.
Automated analysis technology is the top ISR priority for many 
practitioners. They are concerned over any imbalance between 
investment in collectors and in the tools to support analysis that takes 
into account all available sources in the assessment. Algorithms are 
needed to allow analysts to perform real analysis. It is vital to develop 
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capabilities that dramatically improve the ability to manage and use 
the data. AGO has started down this path and adopted Big Data 
techniques to help analysts sift through satellite imagery and monitor 
changes in areas of interest around the world. 
As John Edwards8 has commented, there is little trouble in 
aggregating the massive amounts of data but putting all of that to 
productive use is another story. Big Data tools have now become 
essential for sorting through and making sense out of these massive and 
growing amounts of data. But just as important is the ability of the ISR 
Enterprise to continually update and augment its analytical capabilities, 
which means the solutions must be able to scale. Furthermore, as the 
community also has great need for speed and agility in its solutions, so 
open source software becomes a key requirement.
Those ISR organisations that will benefit most from Big Data 
are the ones that rely on detailed analytics - signals intelligence, 
electronic intelligence, and human intelligence - as well as those 
which use substantial amounts of data to underpin their products, 
such as the AGO.
These organisations will need to add to their teams, people with an 
advanced background in statistics, data mining and machine learning 
skills. Such people will be crucial in getting the most out of various 
technological innovations and tuning them to the particular needs 
of their organisations. Machine speed and processing power, as 
important as they are, can never be a substitute for human creativity 
and intuition at the level of complexity and abstraction that will pertain. 
The potential benefits of Big Data analytics are significant but 
need to be approached with an awareness of the associated risks and 
challenges, especially in balancing the need to protect information 
with the potential benefits of sharing. Currently, this balance does not 
seem to exist and the barriers to sharing are too high. Big Data will 
not solve this. So, there is a need to develop a culture, supported 
by corresponding policies, that incentivises data sharing for the 
8  John Edwards, ‘To tame Big Data, intelligence community needs tools that scale’, 
C4ISR & Networks, 12 November 2013.
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greater good as well as more sophisticated risk-assessment 
models and techniques around the sharing of data. By embracing 
an ISR Enterprise approach, rather than encouraging independent and 
individual entities, such a culture could be developed and enhanced 
for Australia.
Societal Context
There is a societal context that needs to be addressed as the 
collection, transmission and use of volumes and variety of data today 
are larger by orders of magnitude than has historically been the 
case. The exponential growth in the volume of data needing effective 
management is a function of the growth of the internet (particularly 
social media) and more capable sensors in both commercial and 
military systems that create and distribute much richer data for 
eventual analysis. 
Social media conversations and themes will need to be factored in 
to any solution. And these will have greater influence in humanitarian 
issues. Social media research is emerging as a practice that is 
conducted across the public, private and academic sectors. However, 
Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) is not yet a coherent 
academic discipline or distinctive intelligence tradecraft,9 and 
needs to be developed as such. 
The Australian Government also needs to work in collaboration 
with data management and social media companies to improve 
Australia’s national privacy principles and to establish guidelines 
that will strike a balance between privacy rights, security and 
commercial interests. Guidelines are needed that will help improve 
mechanisms for establishing accountability towards principles that 
help to protect and promote Australian privacy rights in a digital age.
9  See Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, ‘The State of the Art: A Literature Review of 
Social Media Intelligence Capabilities for Counter-Terrorism’, The Centre for the 
Analysis of Social Media, Demos, November 2013.
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Skills
There is also a pressing need to address how the necessary 
data management and exploitation skills will be recruited, 
developed and retained, which will demand innovative 
collaborative partnerships with the private sector. Furthermore, 
a collaborative approach with the commercial sector that allows 
Defence to benefit from cutting-edge skills, possibly maintained in the 
reserve forces for example, merits investigation. 
An Enterprise Architecture Approach
Australia needs to adopt an ‘enterprise architecture’ 
approach that allows, from a technical perspective, the removal 
of proprietary interests (standards, protocols, etc) that affect 
interoperability, and the removal of obstacles imposed through 
stove-piped acquisitions. These all constrain the evolution of a 
sovereign ISR capability. 
During research for this Paper, the current situation was described 
pithily as ‘shoeboxes of data of uncertain provenance, managed 
under inconsistent policies for metadata standards, storage or 
retrieval’. These legacy problems will continue without an overarching 
strategic plan and statements of intent to align. This includes the need 
to design and adopt an architectural approach, with clear rules about 
sharing specific data, noting that not all data is shareable to all in the 
ISR Enterprise. Furthermore, there is no point in trying to connect 
databases that are not designed for connectivity. 
The Defence Chief Information Officer Group (CIOG) 2009 
ICT strategy should yield an enterprise ICT structure upon which a 
Defence ISR capability can be delivered. However, this needs more 
support and acceleration if it is to meet its initial capability by 2016 and 
full capability by 2021. Achievement of such a strategic, consolidated 
construct within Defence could then be used as a base for expansion 
across Government, and, ultimately, across the nation.
A substantial body of work is being done by disparate areas, and 
it is being brought together nationally. The National Security Advisor’s 
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Roadmap out to 202010 shows the clear policy intent for improved IT 
alignment across agencies, and, while implementation problems still 
exist, they are not insurmountable.
An enterprise-level architectural approach would also help 
Australia understand its national processes and data flows to ensure 
that human judgment is applied and that legislative and regulatory 
requirements are observed. Access control and authentication 
algorithms that dynamically limit user permissions to correspond 
with changes to the sensitivity of merged datasets will be necessary, 
as will an awareness of where information is held, the jurisdiction 
that applies, and the legal obligations and freedoms that implies. 
One positive development is the implementation of attribute-based 
authentication, in which the data has a privilege and not the user. 
Data Responsibility
The architectural approach would also help in managing the 
provenance of data. For example, while the volume and other aspects 
of Big Data can be dealt with technically, the current challenge is 
the data responsibility spectrum. At one end, AGO is responsible for 
handheld data, but at the other end, AGO/AGD (Attorney-General’s 
Department) are responsible for high-grade classified data; however, 
there is a lot in between, ranging from base cameras to interrogation 
cameras. This is tedious work in some respects, but it is not well 
understood or acknowledged as an issue. Indeed, it is probably the 
subtext of the data-to-decision topic for ISR – the provenance of 
the data, the responsibility for the data, and getting the data to the 
decision-makers.
Approvals Process
Adopting an enterprise architecture approach and leveraging 
developments in Big Data can help to better synchronise ISR 
technology. However, they will not resolve challenges posed 
10  Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, National Security Information 
Environment Roadmap: 2020 Vision, 2010.
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by the approvals process, which needs some serious overhaul, 
particularly because technology is moving so fast. The tradition of 
creating monolithic projects that set requirements years out from 
implementation is not defensible for short life-cycle and software-
dependent ISR capabilities. A program-centric approach within an 
enterprise architecture is needed, supported by faster project 
cycle times and evolutionary acquisition as a matter of course.
Fifth Generation Capabilities
The price of entry into the ISR community is now very high, and 
in order for Australia to sustain its current access, a more strategic 
approach is needed, along with a substantial degree of culture 
change. The United States has invested enormous amounts of 
money in transitioning to its current capability. Geospatial data is now 
provided for appropriate projects, with planners having realised just 
how much data is required in projects. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF) project representatives and representatives from the intelligence 
agencies communicate in order to determine the overall intelligence 
data requirement to ensure project success. In Australia, intelligence 
has not been sufficiently recognised as a fundamental component of 
military capability.
The JSF will ingest data and deliver data in significant volumes - 
data which will be of significant value to Australian interests. Australia 
is only now starting to grasp what this fully means and the extent of 
change needed for the ISR Enterprise to best support this capability. 
Defence is setting up areas for looking beyond the JSF and how 
that data will be delivered and in what form. This is a new challenge 
for Defence and one Australia has not had to face until now. The 
new fifth-generation capabilities such as the JSF and Air Warfare 
Destroyer will bring profound changes to the ISR Enterprise around 
data management and data security, and Australia needs to start 
planning for those changes now.
Synchronising Capabilities 
A multi-disciplinary approach to ISR is needed – collection 
capabilities must complement each other and any limitations in one 
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system should be able to be mitigated through capabilities in other 
systems. A multiplicity of sensors, sources, systems and techniques 
is needed, ensuring that a diversity of insights can be provided by 
different assets to ensure the fullest understanding of the situation. 
These ISR assets are becoming increasingly important, not only to 
support operations, but also in becoming an intrinsic part of them, and 
therefore need to be secure. Furthermore, complete understanding of 
the situation can only come through a clear presentation of the fusion 
of these insights from different assets, which will help ensure effective 
decision-making and proper and prompt responses.
While much of the concern over cyber security today focuses 
on Internet-connected networks, the ISR Enterprise also faces 
challenges around its non-Internet-connected networks, such as 
tactical data links and satellite-control networks. Future warfare will 
involve these types of networks and the systems that connect through 
them, such as satellites, avionics, targeting pods, digital radios, and 
unmanned systems. Effects produced on and through these systems 
will include disruption, distraction, distortion, distrust, confusion, and 
chaos of both a virtual and physical nature. Operators will need to 
address defensive hardening and attack recovery across all networks 
– both those connected to the Internet and those not traditionally 
based on Internet data-transfer protocols and technologies.
The landscape is characterised by the need for a national ISR 
capability, with the military requirement at one end of the spectrum 
and commercial use at the other end, as depicted in the Figure 
below. There is no question that ASD and AGO will now have the 
responsibility of providing information to the State governments – so 
in a sense, Australia is already moving towards a whole-of-nation 
approach. But are the capabilities being effectively synchronised?
AUSTRALIAN ISR ENTERPRISE
Commercial 
Use
National ISR 
Capability
Military 
Requirement
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The Stove-Piped Focus on Projects
There is currently a problem with some projects already in the 
pipeline in terms of how their geospatial data requirements can be 
satisfactorily addressed. At the pre-First Pass stage of the Defence 
requirements process for example, there needs to be greater 
recognition of the importance of joint force integration and 
the need for innovation. Australia needs to move quickly through 
addressing its Defence legacy data and systems, and involve other 
industries in helping to address the future integration challenges. 
However, this needs the right level of funding, the strategic vision and 
intent, and a clear set of national requirements.
JP2096 will provide the backbone for ISR integration (but it is 
unlikely to address sensor integration). First Pass is not scheduled 
until June 2014. Furthermore, JP2096 is the responsibility of the Chief 
Information Officer Group (CIOG), presumably to ensure compatible 
communication standards across Defence, but it lacks a definitive 
capability manager who, as the business process owner, would 
provide the business architecture. Functionally, this Project should 
provide the ‘glue’ – bringing together the platforms, sensors, data 
and human decision-makers. Planning for platform sensor integration 
is important and should be part of JP2096 for all future Defence 
Capability Plan projects. For example, plans are needed for transferring 
the ISR product that will be captured by the P-8A Poseidon aircraft to 
the ISR Enterprise.
JP2064 (referred to as the smart map) will provide the geospatial 
piece (but phases 2 and 3 are yet to clear First Pass)11 while JP2044 
will provide the intelligence piece (Phases 4a and 4b, but how will the 
project come to market – a sensible industry approach would have 
been for a $40m program but it is likely to come out as 10 x $4m 
programs). It does appear, however, that this Project, also with CIOG, 
has at least adopted an evolutionary acquisition approach.
11  JP2064 Phase 2 is the basic geo-portal, while Phase 3 is the geospatial 
infrastructure, information, and services. This project should be accelerated, with 
all phases being better integrated.
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JP1770 (maritime rapid environmental assessment that uses the 
amphibious capability to move forces to the beach) and JP1771 (that 
moves the forces onto land – Army geospatial support systems) have 
yet to address how to get the data off the assets and into ground 
stations. Air Force has three small $5m projects looking at this. JP1778 
is another related project that deals with mine countermeasures and 
concentrates on the area close to the lodgement. RPDE Tasks 49 and 
50 are looking at how geospatial data is to be used to inform SEA1430 
Phase 8.
There is also JP2065 Phases 1 and 2 – Integrated Broadcast 
Service – which is based around a US satellite UHF communications 
system, and JP2044 Phase 4 – Digital Topographic Systems upgrade. 
So, with all of these projects running, is there an understanding 
around who owns ISR in Defence and who ensures the information 
is passed to the ADF and to the wider national security community? 
There is a lot of ISR architecture work still needed, which probably 
needs to be done by the Integrated Capability Development Branch of 
Capability Systems Division in Defence. Perhaps it is time to re-think 
the Defence structure and make one of the Defence Joint three-
star military officers responsible for Defence ISR, and one of the 
deputy secretaries in the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet responsible for policy coordination across the national 
ISR Enterprise. 
The nation needs an all-source ISR capability but that takes time 
and Australia cannot really wait 10 years for this to emerge. Should 
there be a two-star ISR Command to speed things up, or as mentioned 
above, appointment of a Defence ISR Capability Manager? Australia’s 
ISR capability has tended to focus on the nation’s strategic defensive 
posture rather than its deployed military posture, which must change. 
There is a predictive strategic element of ISR which is not done well, 
and there are tactical elements that are managed well. Would a 
two-star ISR Command or a three-star Capability Manager resolve 
this dichotomy? How does Australia merge its JORN capability 
with maritime situational awareness offshore and awareness in the 
airspace over major cities? 
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Clearly, there are dominant roles within Defence for Joint 
Capability Coordination Division (in developing concepts and policy), 
Capability Systems Division (in effecting program management), and 
Joint Operations Command (in using the assets and in helping to set 
the operational requirements). However, there are also integrative 
issues involving the various capability managers in raising and 
training their ISR forces, and in the acquisition and through-life 
support (or sustainment) of the platforms and sensors themselves. 
Notwithstanding these observations for improved coordination and 
integration, it is also vital for the professional mastery within specific 
domains to be retained.
Supporting Deployed Forces
ISR can be a game-changer in the region. However, any real ISR 
capability needs to be connected to the US Pacific Command 
(PACOM) and the US Marines in Darwin. There really does need 
to be a dialogue on deployed forces and their ISR requirements. 
Australian military forces have returned from the Middle East Area of 
Operations (MEAO) to an ISR ‘steam age’. Australia has, for some 
time now, been working with coalition partners in deployed locations 
but that is now changing to simply being allies again. Australia needs 
a dialogue on future posture around its interaction with the United 
States – such as with PACOM. 
Any dialogue on deployed force requirements also needs to 
address responsibility for deployed systems. For example, JP2072 – 
Battlespace Communications – is the responsibility of Army (with input 
from Air Force), but that shifts to the Chief of Joint Operations when 
forces deploy on an operation. Meanwhile, Navy uses SEA1442 to 
address its battlespace communications requirements. Furthermore, 
JP2072 will not be able to move all of the communications required for 
ISR, so future communications choke points will have to be addressed 
through JP2064. 
This communications capacity issue will be exacerbated when 
tele-medicine starts being used extensively in supporting the 
deployed war-fighter. There will never be sufficient communications 
capacity to support all of the requirements. Thus, commanders 
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and other decision-makers will need to be clear as to what can be 
realistically delivered. 
Evolution of ISR Capability
The evolution of ISR capability will become even more important 
as ISR exchange increasingly becomes a two-way process. The ability 
of the commander to ask for what can be practically delivered rather 
than depend on what is delivered because that is all that is available 
will become critical in future. This two-way process involves a deeper 
understanding of the agency that is tasking the ISR assets, of data/
information fusion, of intelligence analysis, and of the capabilities and 
limitations of the processes and systems, all of which leads to more-
informed tasking. This would make for a more efficient and effective 
use of the end-to-end system intended to improve or enhance 
knowledge of the battlespace for the military, or the operational space, 
in the case of law enforcement.
It is important for Defence ISR to improve engagement with the 
capability managers; to adopt a program approach to capability 
development for ISR; to bring industry in as an integral part of 
the capability development process and ensure industry aspects 
are considered early, appropriately and consistently; and 
to make better use of the Capability and Technology 
Demonstrator (CTD) and Rapid Prototype Development and 
Evaluation (RPDE) programs. 
The ADF is facing a change in the nature of its operations through 
the diffusion of threats, global communications, and the increased 
use of unmanned systems, all of which place new demands on 
the ISR Enterprise. The increase in low-intensity insurgencies and 
international criminal organisations has blurred the lines between 
combatants, criminals, and non-combatants. It is important to better 
understand the use of force as it relates to unmanned systems, and 
create a suitable social construct for their use that is more conducive 
to national security policy than the negative connotation that has built 
up over recent years. Australia needs to formulate a national policy 
for unmanned systems and a social construct that will support the 
platform rather than hinder its utility.
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In developing its thinking about ubiquitous ISR, Australia should 
note recent comments from retired US Air Force Lieutenant General 
Garry Trexler.12 Trexler argues that the growth in the military’s 
demand for ISR continues unabated, exacerbated by combat forces 
bringing their own tactical ISR platforms with them into the Area of 
Operations, to improve responsiveness and reduce dependence 
on others, including national systems. Trexler argues for a more 
resilient overhead persistent infrared architecture than a wide-field- 
of-view approach offers based on third-generation infrared 
surveillance technology. 
Trexler also argues for improved Mission Data Processing, 
noting that identifying intelligence Processing, Exploitation and 
Dissemination (PED) tools for the future is no easy task.13 His answer 
to coping with an expanding amount of imagery is to continue to 
improve the software, expand automated processing, and provide 
more sophisticated workstations for analysts. However, he argues for 
greater focus on the people side of things - recruiting, training, and 
retaining sharp, capable people who are able to deal with the modern-
day challenge that is going to become even more complicated. 
Trexler’s suggestion about embracing new fifth-generation 
capabilities in a formal ISR role, indicates the need for Australia to 
think carefully as its fifth-generation capabilities are introduced into 
service. Government and military commanders will need to state their 
requirements in conjunction with advice from the ISR community on 
what is feasible and at what cost. Assignment of priorities to particular 
information and intelligence requirements will also need to be a 
cooperative determination. 
Requirements will also have to be balanced with cost and 
technical feasibility. Taking the JSF as an example, its sensor suite 
could generate terabytes of data, which would be far more than could 
12  Lieutenant General Garry Trexler (USAF, ret’d), ‘Space: Tomorrow and Beyond’, in 
Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol 7, No 3, Fall 2013.
13  A range of current projects, including JP2064 and JP2044, are PED-related and 
urgency to bring them to Initial Operating Capability has been recognised. PED 
tools are critical in better synchronising capabilities.
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possibly be recorded, much less down-linked, in real-time. Therefore, 
precision in the exact requirements of users will need to be provided 
and understood by the ISR community.
Further questions concerning the nature of the data will need to 
be asked – for example, will raw data suffice, will fused data used by 
the operators be enough, will other analysis and insights be needed 
to support more strategic decision-making? Commanders are already 
demanding access to unprocessed data because of the delays 
associated with processing. The real concern is to only supply data 
which a Commander can use. Thus, there is the need to ‘push’ critical 
data/intelligence as well as allowing ‘pulling’ from central databases. It 
is understood that the United States National Reconnaissance Office 
is pursuing this model.
ISR capabilities of unmanned systems such as the MQ-1 
Predator and MQ-9 Reaper in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in 
a transformation of ISR from a support tool to a vital part of every 
military operation for the United States. Australia too is moving along 
this transformational path through its experience with Heron and 
Shadow UAVs.14 Transformation is occurring on another related front 
as well with the target-based, inductive approach to ISR transitioning 
to a problem-based, deductive and proactive anticipatory approach.
There is also a conflation of cyber, space, Electronic Warfare and 
ISR that all need to be integrated into a holistic ISR picture – often 
referred to as ‘fusion’. Institutional barriers and outdated administrative 
arrangements need to be removed and ISR capability synchronised 
and consolidated into a national effort. While synchronising platforms 
and sensors would be a good start-point, that synchronisation must 
extend to professionalising the analytical workforce and investing in 
automated technologies.
14  For an excellent discussion on future directions for Australia’s Unmanned Aerial 
Systems see Williams Foundation, ‘Protecting Australia with UAS’, February 2014.
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United States Developments
The United States is using ISR in different environments in different 
ways and different companies are at the heart of the solutions, 
particularly in supporting the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the 
intelligence community. The United States is addressing integration of 
its backbone systems and Australia needs to capitalise on these efforts. 
The US National Reconnaissance Office has established a 
standards framework (Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise 
(DI2E)) that is focussed on the promotion of Distributed Common 
Ground Station (DCGS) interoperability through either technology 
convergence, or federation. There is a strong desire for coalition 
integration at the ISR/DCGS level which indicates that adoption of the 
DI2E framework (with a limited but suitable adaptation to Australian 
conditions) would be pragmatic. 
Australia will need to leverage the lessons learned by the 
United States in its rapid build-up of its separate, Service-centric 
DCGS networks. As a consequence, the United States has had to 
develop the DCGS Integrated Backbone (the DI2E set of data-sharing 
servers and standards) at considerable cost and time to link the 
various DCGS systems together so analysts can share information. In 
its Defence ISR Integration Backbone, Australia is seeking to start with 
an overarching, or enterprise, approach to intelligence collaboration, 
which equates with the US DI2E framework.
Noting that Australia will seek a multi-source/multi-Service/multi-
theatre ISR capability, one option that should be explored is the 
forthcoming United States Marine Corps (USMC) DCGS. DCGS-MC 
may prove to be highly relevant to Australia’s ISR posture due in the 
main to the USMC tri-Service structural similarity to the ADF and the 
desire to have a single DCGS capability. 
DCGS-Intelligence Community has been identified in the United 
States as an exemplar in terms of the advantages it offers and should 
also be examined for whole-of-nation applicability by Australia. DCGS-
IC is designed to serve the US national intelligence agencies and 
tactical DCGS military units by providing decision-makers, intelligence 
analysts and war-fighters with access to a variety of authoritative 
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data sources from across the national and tactical communities. The 
system draws upon data sources at the agencies and the military 
services, including those linked by other DCGS systems. Searches 
that formerly took hours can now be done within minutes. 
PED is a very important ISR capability element in the United 
States that, notwithstanding improvements, still remains a deficiency 
in Australia’s ISR arsenal. A mature PED capability would allow 
Australia to equip teams of analysts with software tools and give 
them the ability to share their products with other analysts over 
the network provided by the ISR Integrated Backbone. 
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
Future ISR for Australia is about synergy. Integration and 
synchronisation allow the effects of collective ISR to be well in 
excess of their potential when they are separated. All of the data 
and information required for the production of intelligence are the 
result of reconnaissance and surveillance collection; conversely, 
the sole purpose of surveillance and reconnaissance is to collect 
data and information for the production of intelligence. The data 
collected depends upon processing and exploitation common to all 
three activities. Decision-makers tend not to be overly concerned 
about who provides the intelligence and how it is delivered. They are 
not asking for separate ‘I’, ‘S’ and ‘R’ streams on different displays 
or in different formats — they are expecting integrated products on 
identical timelines. 
The complexity, ambiguity, dangers and speed of the emerging 
21st century world require profound improvements in intelligence to 
detect problems as they arise and in networked response options 
to achieve the overall effect required. Faster and more complex 
operations and activities require deeper analysis and planning. 
Because of globalisation and the agility and interrelated nature of 
possible threats, the ISR Enterprise has to be comprehensive and 
address all sources and diversity of requirements, while also including 
both long-term and immediate-term analysis. 
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ISR must be treated as an integrated process, moving it in 
complexity, speed, and effectiveness beyond the current model 
of inter-agency cooperation. Indeed, cooperation, coordination 
and interoperability are no longer enough. Close collaboration is 
needed, which demands greater use of standards for integration and 
information sharing across all levels of government and beyond. 
The ISR community is now undertaking a much broader range of 
functions across increased areas than in the past, which means new 
capabilities are required and a coordinated ISR Enterprise is needed 
to enable this additional work to be accomplished. All efforts need to 
come together in a whole-of-nation approach that brings in industry, 
academia, State jurisdictions and Federal agencies. This demands a 
strategic design from the outset, together with a new culture around 
closer collaboration. In addition, more effective management of 
scarce skills is called for at a national level. Resources will clearly 
be an issue, but just as importantly, Government will need to set 
national priorities. 
This whole-of-nation question must start with the principle that 
ISR and its community represent a national enterprise-level capability. 
Forward planning is important for matching ends, ways and means, 
but it is increasingly vital for that planning to address unforeseen 
operational and strategic demands, and that requires a much stronger 
analytical capability and much closer collaboration.
It is vital for public engagement to be improved - the social balance 
between expectations of actions for security and the need for privacy 
must be struck if the ISR community expects to retain any form of 
social licence. Greater transparency of the checks and balances 
imposed on the ISR Enterprise can lead to a substantial increase 
in the level of trust from the public. It is incumbent on Government 
to encourage the ISR Enterprise (and specifically the intelligence 
institutions) to be more publicly engaged, and indeed for Government 
to more actively support them in this.
It is also vital to accelerate the data-to-decision cycle by adopting 
a Big Data approach which would allow Australia to deal with the 
increasing volume of data, as well as its variety, velocity and variable 
veracity to extract greater insights and more reliable prediction of 
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events. Such an approach can offer faster transition from collection to 
analysis, decision and action; and greater confidence in the analysis, 
decisions and actions.
It is crucial to develop the right capabilities for ISR and ensure they 
are synchronised, which demands from the start, a multi-disciplinary 
approach. Defence has a number of ISR projects in-train, but there 
is no single person in Defence responsible and accountable for ISR. 
Furthermore, there is no single person at the national level to ensure 
that Defence projects align with national requirements. 
ISR can be a game-changer in the region but Australia’s 
capability must be integrated with that of the Americans. Deployed 
force requirements still need a lot of work. The future deployment of 
unmanned systems in support of national security must also address 
the social context and considerable work is required in improving the 
public’s understanding of the role of unmanned systems.
Noting that Australia will seek a multi-source/multi-Service/ 
multi-theatre ISR capability, Australia should look to the forthcoming 
United States Marine Corps DCGS and the DCGS currently used 
by the US intelligence community. DCGS-MC might prove to be 
relevant to Australia’s ISR posture due to the USMC tri-Service 
structural similarity to the ADF, and DCGS-IC is regarded by many 
as the exemplar for effective collaboration across diverse 
organisations.
From a strategic design perspective, Australia needs to align its 
vision, governance, infrastructure, data, and workforce across the 
ISR Enterprise. The start point is vision - in operational, technological 
and policy terms. Governance embodies shared understanding, 
shared commitment, and shared capability objectives, all of which 
demand close and effective cooperation, collaboration and trust 
across all agencies, their enterprise processes, their administrative 
arrangements, and their industry partners.
New information technologies have led to new network 
organisations, new types of collaborative communities and new 
demands being placed on government. Joseph Nye’s interpretation 
of all of this is that information will be dispersed widely, power will 
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thus be distributed more widely and informal networks will prevail over 
traditional bureaucratic forms of communication. 15
In examining the challenges that new information technologies 
are imposing on organisations, Nye also discusses the “paradox of 
plenty”16 by suggesting that an abundance of information leads to 
a paucity of attention. As Nye suggests, when decision-makers are 
overwhelmed with the volume of information before them, they find 
it difficult to know what to focus on and their ability to pay attention 
becomes the scarce resource, rather than the information itself. This 
is, of course, exacerbated by the vast amount of free information that 
inundates them. 
The ability to store data is falling further behind the ability to 
process it.17 The key challenges of this for ISR include: storing the large 
volumes of streaming data from unmanned systems; accommodating 
the large volumes of unstructured data; and scaling up human 
analysts to deal with these increased data volumes. Moving analysts 
from being reactive to predictive and proactive, and automating the 
identification of risks and anomalies will be vital in this respect.
Innovation will be key for the ISR Enterprise to survive and thrive 
in the coming decades. And integration will be crucial, which itself 
introduces the unnatural act of sharing and using the knowledge of 
others to manage critical incidents. Enabling information sharing 
across government in this way would force collaboration and 
distributed decision-making to occur!
Interoperability and integration across agencies, governments 
and other third parties is costly and requires a commitment to the 
development of standards to which all agencies and all levels of 
15  Joseph S. Nye Jr, Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to 
Globalization, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, London and New York, 2004, 
p.82.
16  Herbert A. Simon, ‘Information 101: It’s Not What You Know, It’s How You Know It’, 
The Journal for Quality and Participation, July / August 1998, pp.30-33.
17  See Martin Hilbert and Priscila Lopez, ‘The World’s Technological Capacity to 
Store, Communicate, and Compute Information’, Science, Vol.332, No. 6025, 1 
April 2011.
Getting it Right: Integrating the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise
40 Kokoda Paper 18 – April 2014
government must adhere. All of this will place different demands on 
the workforce and the ISR Enterprise needs to be investing now in new 
competencies; improving workforce skills; and better coordinating the 
workflow of people, resources and materials.
A decade or so ago, intelligence was made up of information from 
human intelligence, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and so 
on, with only a very small part coming from open source information. 
Today, that has changed quite significantly, with so much more 
information being obtained from open sources. 
This freely accessible information is one of the driving factors 
behind today’s ISR imperatives. Another factor is the tight international 
and national fiscal situations that are forcing ISR agencies to evaluate 
their priorities, including how they collaborate and how they invest in 
current capabilities versus the next generation of capabilities. Thus, 
the contemporary ISR capability must be agile and integrated with 
other agencies and partners, and the ISR community must have a 
strong understanding of the operational environment, which includes 
understanding of social issues, social licence and use of social media.
While a clear factor is technology, any focus on technology must 
not lose sight of the people dimension – of the human in the loop of 
the intelligence cycle. The role of ISR is to provide the information 
that leaders need to be able to make better decisions; so, the ISR 
Enterprise must guard itself against being pushed and pulled by 
technology alone.
Australia does seem to be on the cusp either of continuing its 
modest trajectory in improving ISR or of seizing the moment and 
driving step-change improvements that will demand adopting a whole-
of-nation approach, improving public engagement, accelerating the 
data-to-decision cycle through leveraging the benefits of Big Data, 
and synchronising ISR capabilities. This Kokoda Paper recommends 
pursuing these step-change improvements through the four new policy 
approaches identified, as well as continuing to improve Australia’s ISR 
organisations, capabilities, and international and national cooperation. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS
A number of recommendations flow from the discussion in this 
Paper. Some modest improvements could flow from a more aggressive 
pursuit of the current trajectory – in improving existing organisations, 
capabilities, international relationships, and national cooperation. 
However, far greater improvement would come through also pursuing 
four new policy objectives: adopting a whole-of-nation approach, 
improving public engagement, accelerating the data-to-decision cycle 
through leveraging the benefits of Big Data, and synchronising ISR 
capabilities. The major recommendations suggested in this Paper that 
pertain to each of these objectives are summarised below.
Improving the Current Trajectory
• Mapping the current ISR landscape would help establish a 
solid foundation for the future positioning of ISR as a national 
capability, both in terms of making the most out of Australia’s 
current organisations (in removing any duplication) and getting 
more out of existing capability through greater integration and 
improved information sharing.
• Australia needs to select a standards framework to facilitate 
improved integration and collaboration across the ISR 
Enterprise, as well as with international partners.
• It is time to move away from a systems-engineering perspective 
for acquisition of ISR capability to a software-engineering 
approach that is better-suited to short life-cycle and software-
dependent ISR capabilities.
• While Australia’s agencies have evolved an effective policy-
coordinating mechanism at a national level, there remains a 
lack of synchronisation in funding, capability development and 
maintenance, and standard setting, which conspire against 
achieving a true national-level ISR capability, and which needs 
to be remedied.
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Adopting a Whole-of-Nation Approach 
• The current sense of cooperation that exists across the ISR 
Enterprise needs to be captured and evolved into a new culture 
centred on closer collaboration. Thus, there is a need to create 
a more strategic design to ensure that enhanced collaboration 
across agencies can be achieved. In this respect, it is vital to 
incorporate non-Commonwealth government organisations 
such as academia, industry and other civic actors in the 
ISR Enterprise.
• Increased investment is needed to facilitate a move to a whole-
of-nation capability that will, as it matures, deliver efficiencies, 
particularly through rationalisation (and thus removal of 
duplication) and better integration of processes, people, 
technology, and administrative arrangements.
• The ISR funding process must become more systematic 
to remove peaks and troughs that can affect the quality 
of analysis.
• With the increased focus on the Indo-Pacific, Australia needs 
to expand its partnering role with the United States in terms 
of ISR across the region, as well as in space and cyberspace.
• Australia could also do more to develop best practice in the 
area of ISR infrastructure resilience and transfer this to benefit 
regional countries that are still in the early stages of developing 
and connecting their ISR infrastructure.
Improving Public Engagement
• In developing a sovereign ISR capability for protecting national 
borders and beyond, the Government needs to focus on areas 
of national interest that do not compromise the rights, privileges 
and privacy of its citizens. 
• The role of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security 
could be used more in improving engagement with the wider 
community, drawing on the sense of trust that exists with the 
Australian Defence Force, and including greater collaboration 
with the Privacy Commissioner. 
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• Public fears around the invasion of privacy need to be allayed, 
which demands greater transparency from the Government 
and public officials. But it is more than transparency as the 
public can also act as a resource; thus improved public 
engagement is needed.
Accelerating the Data-to-Decision Cycle 
• Leveraging commercial advances in Big Data can improve 
decision-making; however, there are legal roadblocks and 
technological and cultural problems to sharing data which 
need to be overcome. A plan is needed for taking advantage of 
Big Data to speed up the decision cycle.
• The ISR Enterprise can learn from how successful businesses 
have used Big Data to improve their competitive advantage 
through meeting three challenges - identifying the information 
and how and where it is stored, tagging the data to allow its 
characteristics to be identified, and running the data through 
an algorithm that allows it to be collated and presented to 
an analyst.
• It is quite likely that competence and capability in Big Data will 
become a mandatory requirement for future operations with 
the United States – and Australia will need to address this if it 
wishes to continue to access US ISR capability in future. 
• Big Data analytics have a potentially significant role in helping 
to manage the flood of data and assisting analysts to focus 
their efforts on analysing content rather than searching for 
relevant information. Improvements in tools and techniques 
are needed to support the search and analysis of ISR data.
• Big Data will not solve the challenge of balancing the need 
to protect information with the potential benefits of sharing. 
Thus, there is a need to develop a culture, supported by 
corresponding policies, that incentivises data sharing for the 
greater good as well as more sophisticated risk-assessment 
models and techniques around that sharing.
• Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) needs to be developed 
as a coherent academic discipline and distinctive intelligence 
tradecraft. 
Getting it Right: Integrating the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Enterprise
44 Kokoda Paper 18 – April 2014
• The Australian Government also needs to work in collaboration 
with data management and social media companies to 
improve Australia’s national privacy principles and to establish 
guidelines that will strike a balance between privacy rights, 
security and commercial interests. 
• There is a pressing need for the ISR Enterprise to address how 
the necessary skills will be recruited, developed and retained, 
which will demand innovative collaborative partnerships with 
the private sector.
• Australia needs to adopt an ‘enterprise architecture’ approach 
that allows, from a technical perspective, the removal of 
proprietary interests (such as standards and protocols) that 
affect interoperability, and the removal of obstacles imposed 
through stove-piped acquisitions. 
• A program-centric approach is also needed to improve the 
approvals process and support faster project cycle times and 
evolutionary acquisition for short life-cycle and software-
dependent ISR capabilities. 
• The new fifth-generation capabilities such as the Joint 
Strike Fighter and Air Warfare Destroyer will bring profound 
changes to the ISR Enterprise around data management and 
data security, and Australia needs to start planning for those 
changes now.
Synchronising Capabilities
• The geospatial data requirements of Defence projects already 
in the pipeline need to be more satisfactorily addressed. Joint 
force integration and the need for innovation are vital and 
demand greater attention prior to First Pass consideration of 
capital projects. 
• There are many ISR projects in train but there needs to be a 
clear capability manager to ensure these are being phased-in 
effectively and integrated. In Defence, this would sit best with 
a Three-Star military officer. For whole-of-government, this 
should sit with a Band-Three officer in the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet. It might also be worth examining 
the merits of appointing a military Two-Star ISR Commander.
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• ISR needs to be viewed as a game-changer in the region; 
however, any real ISR capability needs to be connected to 
the US Pacific Command (PACOM) and the US Marines in 
Darwin. Greater attention needs to be focused on deployed 
forces and their ISR requirements, particularly with respect to 
responsibility for deployed systems.
• Defence ISR must improve engagement with the capability 
managers; adopt a program approach to capability 
development for ISR; bring industry in as an integral part of the 
capability development process and ensure industry aspects 
are considered early, appropriately and consistently; and make 
better use of the CTD and RPDE programs. 
• Australia will need to leverage the lessons learned by the 
United States in its rapid build-up of its separate, Service-
centric DCGS networks and its consequent development 
of Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E), and 
monitor future developments. 
• Australia needs to improve its Processing, Exploitation and 
Distribution (PED) capability to equip teams of analysts with 
software tools and give them the ability to share their products 
with other analysts over the network provided by the ISR 
Integrated Backbone.
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Getting it Right:  
Integrating the Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance Enterprise
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
functions are essential for effective operations spanning 
military, border protection and law enforcement activities, 
as well as in strategic decision-making. These functions 
provide greater situational awareness and better predictive 
intelligence necessary for superior decision-making at all 
levels. ISR synchronises and integrates the planning and 
operation of platforms, sensors, data, and people.
The ISR process must be treated as an integrated process, 
moving it in complexity, speed, and effectiveness beyond 
the current model of inter-agency cooperation. Australia 
can continue its modest trajectory in improving ISR or it 
can drive step-change improvements that will necessitate 
adopting a whole-of-nation approach, achieving closer 
engagement with the public, accelerating the data-to-
decision cycle by leveraging the benefits of Big Data, and 
synchronising ISR capabilities.
